It was on this basis and under these conditions that the Anglo-German naval agreement was blocked on 18 June 1935. This was expressed by both parties by mutual agreement on the conclusion of the contract. Moreover, following the Munich Conference, the German Chancellor and the British Prime Minister solemnly confirmed last autumn, in the declaration they signed, that they regarded the agreement as a symbol of the desire of the two peoples never to go to war again. By this policy of encirclement, the British Government unilaterally withdrew its base from the Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935, thus putting an end to that Agreement and to the supplementary declaration of 17 July 1937. The qualitative provisions of the Anglo-German Agreement of 17 July 1937 are not affected by those observations imposed against their will on the German Government. The federal government will continue to comply with these provisions, thereby helping to avoid a general unlimited race in the naval arms of nations. In addition, if the British Government wishes to enter into negotiations with Germany on the future problems arising from this, the Federal Government is prepared to do so. It would be good if a clear and categorical agreement could then be reached on a secure basis. Paragraph operations are performed directly in the full article text window on the left. Sales operations include:. When, in 1935, the German government proposed to the British government to increase the strength of the German fleet to a fixed share of the force of the naval forces of the British Empire by treaty, it did so on the basis of the firm conviction that the repetition of a bellicose conflict between Germany and Great Britain was forever excluded. By voluntarily recognizing the priority of British interests at sea through the offer of the 100:35 ratio, she believed that with this unique decision in the history of the great powers, she was taking a step that would lead to the establishment of a friendly relationship forever between the two nations. This step by the German Government was, of course, subordinate to the determination of the British Government to adopt a political attitude which would guarantee a friendly development of Anglo-German relations.
The same applies to Part III of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 17 July 1937, which defines the obligation of a mutual exchange of information between the British and Germany. Compliance with this obligation is of course based on the condition of an open relationship of trust between two partners. Since the German Government, to its great regret, can no longer regard that relationship as existing, it must also consider the abovementioned provisions of Part III to be null and void. The federal government is still committed to this wish and is still inspired by it today. It is aware that it has acted accordingly in its policy and, in no event, that it has intervened in the sphere of English interests or that it has intervened in any way in those interests. . . .